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Not crying “peace”
The theological politics of Herbert McCabe∗
Simon Hewitt
University of Leeds
Author accepted draft. Final version in New Blackfriars.
Herbert McCabe was, by widespread acclaim, one of the greatest Catholic
thinkers in the English speaking world during the final quarter of the last cen-
tury. He was also deeply committed to radical left-wing politics. What is the
relationship between these two facts? There is a temptation, especially in a
climate not favourable to the marriage of radical politics and Christianity, to
suggest that they are at best accidentally related. Thus after McCabe’s death
one got the impression that he was for many a brilliant theologian and philoso-
pher, with numerous important things to say about topics such as creation and
the eucharist, who just happened to have rather eccentric political opinions.
These, ran the implication, were best passed over in silence.1
This is a mistake. Not only are McCabe’s political ideas interesting in their
own right, and an important corrective to current trends in both theology and
analytic philosophy, but at crucial points his understanding of central theologi-
cal topics (creation, God, idolatry) is emeshed with his politics, such that any
attempt to separate the two is bound to distort McCabe’s intentions in writing.
In this article, I will lay out what I take to be the key themes in McCabe’s
politics before arguing that, in contrast to significant strands in present day
political theology, he had a keen sense of the respective roles of faith and reason
in guiding political action. This allowed him to commit himself to a politics
which was more radical than much of what has followed him, whilst having a
clear sense of how Christian faith ought to be allowed to condition political
engagement. The article concludes by drawing out lessons from McCabe for
thinking about faith and politics. Not least of these is that we ought to avoid
the lure, often articulated in terms of the ‘unifying’ role of the Church, to es-
chew conflict. At the moment there is a lot of pressure to echo those condemned
by the prophet Jeremiah, proclaiming peace where there is no peace.2 McCabe
cautions us against this constantly, and for theologically interesting reasons.
∗Thanks to Peter Hunter OP, Rachel Muers, and Tasia Scrutton for discussion of themes
covered here.
1Important exceptions here are Denys Turner’s lecture [32], with which I disagree at points
(as will become apparent), but which is essential reading, and Terry Eagleton’s enduring
interest in McCabe – see especially [4], [3], and [5] for works which show his influence.
2‘They have treated the wound of my people carelessly, saying, “Peace, peace,” when there
is no peace.’ Jeremiah 6:14, NRSV. See below for the same theme in Ezekiel.
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1 God, the gods and oppression
Above all else, McCabe was a theologian in the thomist tradition, understanding
the purpose of his discipline (whether pursued as a branch of philosophy, or as
taking its lead from biblical revelation) as being to speak of God (STh Ia, Q1,
a.7). Schooled in analytic philosophy, however, and in particular in the work of
Wittgenstein, he was attentive to questions about the limits of sense and was
acutely aware that these pressed themselves with particularly urgency around
theological language. His particular contribution to the recasting of thomism in
the light of analytic philosophy,3 was the description of a way-in to talk of God
which made comprehensible the severe limits of our capacity to speak of God.
Since McCabe considered the observation of these limits to be of supreme im-
portance for politics, it is worth outlining here McCabe’s approach to God-talk.
‘For a large class of cases of employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not
for all - this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use
in the language’ [34, 43]; thus Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations.
In a late 20th century context where the meaningfulness of the word ‘God’ had
been the object of doubt,4 McCabe undertook to demonstrate that it had an
intelligible use, and therefore a meaning.5 Moreover, his favoured way of do-
ing this gives us reason to believe that God exists. In this way, he refashions
Thomas’ natural theology for the age of linguistic philosophy.
How is the word ‘God’ used?6 For McCabe, in line with the thomist instinct
that we talk about God through talking about God’s creatures, its paradigmatic
use is in supplying an answer to a question: ‘why is there something rather than
nothing at all?’ [19, 5]. So, assuming of course that this question is in good
order,7 we are entitled to say that God exists just in case there is something
rather than nothing at all, which of course there is. In spite of an appearance
of theological bravado, McCabe’s claim here is modest, for God is an answer to
the question of existence only in a certain sense. The word ‘God’ has a use in
our language, namely designating whatever it is which is the reason why there
is something rather than nothing at all. The nature of whatever that may be
is hidden from us. As McCabe writes, ‘By ‘creation’ we mean the dependence
of all that is, in so far as it is. We do not know what it is that it depends on,
we do not know the nature of God’ [20, 10]. Here he is entirely in line with
Aquinas’ insistence that we cannot know what God is but only what he is not
(STh Ia pr. Q3).8
Behind this apophaticism lies a realisation that in order to adequately an-
3On which, see [27] and [8]. McCabe is often counted part of the loose movement known as
‘grammatical thomism’; see [25] on this, although the details of Mulhall’s exegesis of McCabe
are criticised in [].
4For an overview, see [6].
5Theology, for McCabe, is concerned with ‘trying to stop us talking nonsense’ [16, 215]
6For more details on McCabe’s approach to the word ‘God’ see my []
7Doubt about this was voiced by Russell in debate with Coppleston [28], which McCabe
references.
8In emphasising Aquinas’ apophaticism McCabe, along with other thinkers in the ‘gram-
matical thomist’ tradition, such as Burrell and Davies, is an important corrective to the
downplaying of its importance by prominent analytic readers of Aquinas, e.g. [30].
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swer the question of existence, anything picked out by the word ‘God’ would
have to lie beyond the ordinary reach of our language, devised as it is for use
within the created order. God ‘is always dressed verbally in second-hand clothes
that don’t fit him very well’. In particular, the conditions under which we can
assign everyday objects to categories or assert significantly about their internal
structure, are never satisfied in the case of God. Moreover inferences that would
be routine from claims about creatures are blocked in the case of God, precisely
because God is the reason creatures exist over and against nothing:
If God is whatever answers our question, how come everything? then
evidently he is not to be included amongst everything. God cannot
be a thing, an existent among others. It is not possible that God and
the universe should add up to make two. Again, if we are to speak of
God as causing the existence of everything, it is clear that we must
not mean that he makes the universe out of anything. Whatever
creation means it is not a process of making. [19, 6]
Now: use the word ‘world’ to mean the created order, which we perceive
with our senses and grasp with our minds, and which we use our language to
navigate our way about.9 God is not an item in the world. This fact is taken
by McCabe to be of crucial political importance. The Creator is not an item in
the creation: God cannot be contained within our conceptual frameworks and
so, if we are to speak of him faithfully, cannot be manipulated with ideological
purpose, fitted neatly into an account of the world in order to serve the interests
of dominant interests. Nor does God compete causally with creatures, so appeal
to the divine cannot properly be made in order to mystify worldly injustice. In
these respects, McCabe holds, the Creator God who is the object of both nat-
ural theology and biblical faith contrasts sharply with the gods:
[I]t is the God of the Hebrews (who in the Jewish interpretation
comes to be seen as creator) who is hailed in the decalogue as lib-
erator; it is the gods (parts of history) and the whole religion of the
gods that is seen to stand for alienation and dependency. ‘I am the
Lord10 your God who brought you out of slavery; you shall have no
gods.’
God the creator, who is not one of the participants in history but
the mover of Cyrus and of all history, is the liberator fundamentally
because he is not a god, because there are no gods, or at least no
gods to be worshiped. This leaves history in human hands under
the judgement of God. Human misery can no longer be attributed
to the gods and accepted with resignation or evaded with sacrifices.
The long slow process can begin of identifying the human roots of
oppression and exploitation, just as the way now lies open for the
scientific understanding and control of the forces of nature. [23, 43]
9This is something like Wittgenstein’s sense of the word in [33]. Contemporary analytic
philosophers are prone to be unsettled by assertions that God is not an item in the world,
since they tend to hear the word ‘world’ as meaning all that exists. Clarity here is important.
10The original fills out the tetragrammaton; I’ve modified it in accordance with current
Catholic practice and congruously with the subject matter.
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We are set free to understand the histories we inhabit in order to change
society for the better. In the next section we’ll see how McCabe applied this
insight to the concrete reality of modern capitalist societies.
2 Seeing the class struggle clearly
‘The criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth’, wrote Marx sig-
nalling his own turn from the criticism of theology to the critique of the social
relations which, he believed, are both a precondition of and provide an impetus
to theological speculation [13]. Similarly for McCabe, possession of an adequate
theology of creation enables us to go about understanding the social order in
a manner that is, in a certain sense, non-theological. For sure, our societies
are part of God’s creation and (as we will see) subject to God’s eschatological
judgement. However, it is not the case that God lies behind every machination
of the state or the stock market as a worldly cause, nor did God assign the rich
man to his castle and the poor man to his gate. To hold otherwise would be to
misunderstand God as being a god.
If God’s action is not a substitute for creaturely causes within human so-
cieties, the prospect lies open for developing an immanent understanding of
the workings of our society in order to transform it for the better. Such an
understanding, with respect to capitalist societies, McCabe found in Marx-
ist thought.11 It is important to be clear about McCabe’s relation to Marx-
ism in order to grasp adequately how he thinks social theory might inform a
theologically-inflected politics. His affirmation of key Marxist claims is not a
matter of striking a radical pose, nor of following intellectual fashion (in fact, by
the time McCabe began to engage with Marxism, academic fashion was shifting
away from it in the direction of postmodernism). McCabe thinks that these
claims are true [18]. It is common enough, of course, that the inhabitants of
capitalist societies do not recognise the of truth those claims; such is the effect
of ideology, without which no exploitative social system could survive.12 That
these claims are true, however, means that they cannot simply be ignored, still
less denounced as un-Christian (truth, after all, cannot contradict truth).13 In-
stead, what is the case about capitalist society, as disclosed by Marx, has to
be taken as the basis for political action within that society. If our efforts on
behalf of a better world are not grounded in the truth about the present world,
they will be shaky indeed, for it is out of the present that the future will be built.
The truth of Marxist claims is, of course, a matter to be settled a posteriori,
by investigation of and theorising about the world,14 and McCabe relies on
11Marxism is typically claimed not simply as a theory of capitalist societies, but of class-
based societies in general, having a particular explanatory aspiration with respect to the
transition between modes of production. Whilst McCabe mentions the contrast between
capitalism and feudalism in passing, his focus is on the former.
12For an interesting take on ideology in relation to Christian-Marxist dialogue, written
during the same period as McCabe’s key political writings, see [31].
13It would be interesting to explore the manner in which McCabe’s concern for truth,
however discovered, is characteristically Dominican.
14Which is compatible with Marxism’s own insistence that such theorising can only be ade-
quately undertaken in combination with praxis within a working class movement, an instance
of what Marx terms ‘practical-critical activity’ [9]. For a useful overview of epistemological
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other people having done that work successfully. His work is not then the
place to look for an argument for the truth of a Marxist account of capitalist
society. But what are the truths that McCabe takes the Marxist tradition to
have uncovered about the kind of society we inhabit? In The Class Struggle
and Christian Love he foregrounds the class division within capitalist society
between a majority of workers and the owners of capital. The former must
sell their labour-power to the latter, yet it is only through the work performed
by the former that value, and therefore profit, is created. Here McCabe is
communicating ideas which Marx develops throughout his corpus, from the early
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts up to the mature development of the
labour theory of value in Volume One of Capital [10][11]. Importantly, given the
understandable tendency of radical Christian social thought to organise itself
around the biblical concept of the poor,15 on this understanding class is not a
matter of differences in wealth or of social status, but rather of differing positions
within the system of relations by which economic activity is organised,
On this fundamental difference between worker and employer the
whole class system rests. The worker is whoever by productive work
actually creates wealth. The employer is not simply anyone who
makes overall decisions about what work shall be done and how; he is
the one who takes the surplus wealth created by the worker and uses
it (in his own interests of course) as capital. Capitalism is just the
system in which capital is accumulated for investment, in their own
interests, by a group of people who own the means of production and
employ large numbers of other people who do not own the means of
production but produce both the wealth they receive back in wages
and the surplus wealth which is used for investment by the owners.
[18, 188]
The organisation of economic activity in this fashion builds antagonistic
relationships between human beings into the very structure of society. In passing
McCabe mentions the competition between capitalist firms, which lends the
system its dynamism, and the frequent wars between capitalist states. Most
fundamentally of all, however, capitalism sets the interests of workers and those
of employers in opposition: profit is value which is not paid out in wages. All
other things being equal one side of industry can only better its condition at
the expense of the other. This is not, emphasises McCabe, the result of greed,
or rabble-rousing, or the failure of people to live together harmoniously. Rather
the lack of economic peace is built into capitalism itself,
[T]he class war is intrinsic to capitalism. It is part of the dynamic
of the capitalist process itself. It’s not as though somebody said:
‘Let’s have a class struggle, let’s adjust the imbalance of wealth by
organising the poor workers against the rich capitalists’. Nothing of
the kind. The tension and struggle between worker and capitalist is
an essential part of the process itself. [18, 190]
At this point McCabe holds that a clear view of how things are in capital-
questions around Marxism, see [2]
15The obvious example here is liberation theology.
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ist society leads to a realisation that things are not how they ought to be.16
Writing for a Christian audience he frames the ethical objection to capitalism
in terms of Christian revelation, but this should not be taken as implying that
the problems with capitalism can’t be seen by any suitably situated person of
good will, on a purely ‘natural’ basis.17 The problem for Christian ethics is
particularly apparent, since Christianity holds that human beings were created
and redeemed, and destined for, the life of charity18 – the life of friendship with
God and with one another. To the extent that we live in antagonism with one
another we are not being what we are called to be [18, 192]. Under capitalism
we cannot but live in antagonism with one another, therefore there is an imper-
ative to bring about a non-capitalist society.
There is a sense in which it follows from this that McCabe agrees with con-
ventional thought that class struggle is in tension with a Christian vision of
society.19 That there is class struggle is a reminder that we do not yet inhabit
the Kingdom in its fulness, that – like the rest of creation – human societies
are still ‘[waiting] with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God’20.
The mistake, according to McCabe, is to conclude on this basis that Christians
ought not to consciously engage in class struggle. On the contrary, they ought
to deliberately take sides within it, in order to win it and end it.
To understand his reasoning here it is important to grasp two components of
his view of capitalist society. First, as we have already seen, he holds that class
struggle is inherent within capitalism and, since it permeates our entire economic
lives, we cannot abstain from engagement it: we either explicitly choose sides
or, by inaction, side with the dominant party. Second, following Marx, he takes
there to be an asymmetry in the class struggle: whilst the bourgeoisie struggles
in order to maintain its position within capitalism, the working class can only
win the class struggle by doing away with capitalism, and thereby class society.21
‘The only way to end the class struggle is to win it’ [18, 195]. Since Christians
cannot, by the nature of the case abstain from involvement in class struggle, and
since capitalism injures human flourishing by setting people against each other,
Christians ought to actively align themselves with the working class. After all,
Christianity is not an ideal theory, it is a praxis, a particular kind of
challenge to the world. Christians, therefore, do not, or should not,
stand around saying, ‘What a pity there is capitalism and the class
war’. They say, or should say, ‘How are we going to change this?’
[18, 193]
16Here he deviates from the dominant conviction in moral philosophy since Hume, that
there is a clear distinction between facts and values . For McCabe’s moral philosophy more
generally, see [17] and [22].
17On secular ethical objections to capitalism within Marxism itself, see [1].
18In the medieval sense of caritas, reflected in current Catholic liturgy, rather than the
degraded modern sense.
19He begins The Class Struggle and Christian Love with the wry remark that (where rev-
olutionary liberation is understood in terms of class struggle) ‘[that the] Christian gospel is
incompatible with revolutionary liberation [is] one of the few positions shared by the Interna-
tional Marxist Group, Mrs Thatcher and Joseph Stalin’ [18, 182].
20Romans 8:19, NRSV.
21See here Marx’s early notion of the proletariat as a universal class, whose interests are
universal human ones, insofar as they include the end of class society [12].
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Set free by a non-idolatrous theology to think systematically about human
society, McCabe thinks that we can see how capitalist society is permeated by
dehumanising antagonism. He also believes that we can do away with this by
participating in the struggle to move beyond capitalism. In the next section we
will see how he thinks Christians ought to comport themselves in that struggle.
3 Politics in the light of the Kingdom
That capitalist society functions in the fashion described above, and that work-
ing class agency can provide the basis for transcending that society are positions
to be justified on the basis of reflection on social experience, not to be deduced
from Christian doctrine.McCabe says that he wants Catholics to be socialists,
not because he is a Catholic but because he is a socialist [14, 90]. Given,
however, that a Christian is a socialist, McCabe thinks that there are impor-
tant constraints on how she ought to conduct herself in political struggle and
on how she ought to understand that struggle and its outcomes in relation to
salvation history. His reflections on these matters are likely to be interesting
even to those who do not accept his empirical claims about capitalism and class.
The Christian revolutionary must, of course, be informed by the teaching of
the gospels. McCabe finds the Sermon on the Mount especially instructive for
political conduct. Far from impeding struggle he holds, attention to this makes
for mature and commited action:
Who, after all, wants a comrade in the struggle who is an arrogant,
loudmouthed aggressive bully? The kind of person who jumps on the
revolutionary bandwagon in order to work off his or her bad temper
or envy or unresolved conflict with parents does not make a good and
reliable comrade. Whatever happened to all those ‘revolutionary’
students of 1968? What the revolution needs is grown-up people
who have caught on to themselves, who have recognised their own
infantilisms and to some extent dealt with them – people in fact who
have listened to the Sermon on the Mount. [18, 195]
Such people will be ‘loving, kind, gentle, unprovoked to anger’. If the de-
scription is not one conventionally associated with a revolutionary activist, that
is not because McCabe advocates a watered-down radicalism made safe for the
Christian gospel. Instead, as the quotation above indicates, he takes the gospel
to be the best guide to living through the tensions and frustrations which attach
to political action in a world where the very structures and forces which render
such action necessary make it difficult to engage in it with human integrity.22
The precarious situation of the person trying to live out the demand of Chris-
tian love, in a context where that demand requires radical engagement, is also in
22This tension is captured well in Brecht’s To Posterity:
For we knew only too well:
Even the hatred of squalor
Makes the brow grow stern.
Even anger against injustice
Makes the voice grow harsh. Alas, we
Who wished to lay the foundations of kindness
Could not ourselves be kind.
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the foreground of McCabe’s insistence on forgiveness in political life. Against a
misunderstanding of the concept of forgiveness which views it as reconciliation
to injustice (here a good deal of work by feminist theologians could supplement
what McCabe has to say), he views it as parallel to, and not incompatible with,
the struggle for justice. That I forgive my enemy in no way implies that I may
not have to fight him. How can sense be made of this?
The answer lies in McCabe’s understanding of the Kingdom of God, which
at once belongs to the eschatological future and is yet already present, inau-
gurated through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Christians therefore
consciously inhabit two realities: the broken, class-ridden world shot through
with exploitation and oppression, and God’s Kingdom of justice, love, and peace.
Because we do not simply inhabit the former McCabe holds that a ‘Christian
cannot fully accept Chairman Mao’s saying that there is, as yet, no brother-
hood of man, that it must wait until the establishment of communism’ [18,
197]. Equally, though, the Christian does inhabit a fractured world lacking the
prerequisites for flourishing human community: she cannot pretend that the
Kingdom is fully realised, or sign up to liberal optimism about the extent of
already-existing human fellowship. Instead, she has to inhabit the tension, liv-
ing in the world as a citizen of the Kingdom. Her forgiveness of her enemies is
a concrete witness to her occupying these dual realities: that she has enemies
shows that she has not abandoned the call to live in the present, she has faced
up squarely to current conflicts and has taken sides in them; yet her forgiveness
of those enemies is a wager on those conflicts not being the last word about
humanity. It anticipates the reconciliation of the Kingdom, already present by
grace,
Through grace, through the life of Christ in him, the Christian is
able, in an odd way, to adopt the perspective of God, who loves both
the just and the unjust. This does not make the unjust any less
unjust; this does not in any way diminish the need for the strugge,
the need for smashing the power of the exploiter and oppressor, but
it does, in the end make hatred impossible [18, 198]
The presence of the future Kingdom is particularly focused, and rendered
sacramentally present, in the Church. McCabe has important things to say
about the collective political role of the Church in the light of this coming King-
dom. In Christ and Politics, he sketches four models for how the Church should
relate to society: as alternative, as model, as social cement, and as challenge [14,
87]. Finding problems with the first three, McCabe advocates the fourth. The
Church as such does not seek political power, however, like Christ himself, its
very existence poses a threat to those in political power in any age (or at least
it does if the Church is being true to its calling). This is because the Church’s
proclamation challenges the ultimate importance of any political set-up. So,
The preaching of the gospel (although of course it takes place at a
particular juncture in history) has its perspective not on an imme-
diate and particular objective but on the eschaton, on the ultimate
destiny of human beings and humankind. That is why, unlike so-
cialism as such, the gospel is not a programme for political action:
not because it is too vague and general or too private, but because
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it is also a critique of action itself, a reminder that we must think
on the end. [14, 90]
A Christian who agrees with McCabe in his analysis of capitalism and his
support for socialism, nonetheless as a Christian must relativise both her po-
litical action and its desired outcome in the light of the coming Kingdom. She
cannot give her whole self to the struggle, which does not make her any less
effective but which does serve as both a sign and a warning to those for whom
the immediate future holds the last word on human society.
4 The politics of faith and reason
In the final two sections, I’ll explore the lessons that can be learned fromMcCabe
for today’s politically engaged Christians. In the present section, I’ll address the
relationship between faith and reason, and the extent to which there can be a
distinctively Christian politics. Then, in the following section, I’ll suggest that
his acknowledgement of social divisions and partisanship with respect to them
presents an important alternative to a common Christian approach to politics.
There is a temptation to think that any Christian who is both involved
in political action and serious about her faith ought to combine the two com-
mitments by espousing a distinctively ‘Christian’ form of politics. Certainly
history provides no shortage of examples of attempts at Christian politics in all
sections of the political spectrum: think about Christian socialism in Britain, or
the tradition of Christian Democracy on the European continent. The former
tradition is particularly relevant to our purposes, both because one might sup-
pose McCabe to have been sympathetic to it and because it has been placed on
the contemporary agenda by political and intellectual movements alike. With
the British labour movement, for example, the current known as Blue Labour
has appealed to the community-forging potential of religion [7],23 whilst within
academic theology the Radical Orthodoxy tendency has advocated an explicitly
theological politics and rejected the secular nature of contemporary socialism
[24] [26].
Mccabe rejects any such Christian exclusivism in politics; he takes it as
read that Christians will be engaging in secular political movements with un-
derstandings and immanent world-views which in no way depend on Christian
faith. Whatever distinctively Christian contribution members of the Church
make to those movements it will not be in terms of political content. Instead, as
we have seen, McCabe thinks that Christians bring with them a characteristic
ethical comportment and a capacity to both interpret and relativise political ac-
tion in terms of God’s saving eschatological action in Christ. This way of being
both Christian and political expresses a characteristically thomistic conviction
of the possibility for harmony between faith and reason, grace and nature: if
my purely human capacity to understand the world (exercised properly) tells
me that capitalism impedes human flourishing, the Christian gospel is not going
to tell me otherwise, nor is the life of grace going to lead me to do anything
23Note that the Blue Labour vision for the Church would be as social cement in the fashion
discussed in the previous section.
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essentially injurious to humankind.
So McCabe has a principled basis for thinking that the political commit-
ments of Christians needn’t themselves be explicitly Christian. The role of the
Christian in secular politics is to live as Christians, as people called to love as
Christ loves, within them, counting them as less than ultimate in the light of
the coming Kingdom. As Schillbeecx describes a similar view,
The Christian sees the autonomous morality of humanity concretely
in the context of a practice in accord with the kingdom of God on
which he or she has set his or her hope. The spirituality of the
ethics of Christians, which as ethics really does not add anything to
an autonomous reality focused on men and women and their worth,
lies in theologal life: in a warm relationship with God; life in faith,
hope and love which is celebrated in the liturgy, meditated on criti-
cally in faith in contemplation and practised in the everyday life of
Christians. [29, 50]
As Christians we commit ourselves to the cause of humanity, which those
who do not share our faith are able to identify, but we do so in the belief that
God has declared himself for that cause and will bring it to fruition. At this
point we should at least take note of an objection with which a position such
as McCabe’s is likely to be met by adherents of Radical Orthodoxy and similar
movements (here is not the place to meet that objection adequately, but I can
at least suggest how I think McCabe can be defended).24 Isn’t talk of ‘human
flourishing’ or ‘the cause of humanity’ as though these are things which can be
identified by those with Christian faith, and those without, alike and pursued
together by both fundamentally mistaken? For isn’t all human reality already
transformed by grace, such that a purely secular view of it is simply mistaken,
and an account of human flourishing constructed in these terms inevitably want-
ing?
There’s an extent to which McCabe can agree with almost all of this. He
certainly does not reject the insight of nouvelle theologie thomism that human
existence is already graced. And because of this he does think that any secular
account of human flourishing is going to be missing something crucial, namely
our need to be transformed through the death and resurrection of Christ so as
to come to participate in the life of God. It simply does not follow from this,
however, that there is not overlap between secular and Christian accounts of
flourishing (grace, after all, does not destroy nature), nor that there can’t be
complete agreement about the action needed here-and-now to make the world
liveable, nor that Christian thinkers can’t talk about purely natural human
goods.25 Moreover the distinction between faith and reason is not the same
distinction as that between grace and nature; the latter concerns reality, the
24Within a Catholic context – which is not that of most of the Radical Orthodoxy authors –
I’d also want to emphasise the conherence between McCabe’s position and that of the Vatican
II constitution Gaudium et Spes.
25One confusion at play here often seems to be the thought that because there is actually
no such thing as pure nature, we cannot talk about pure nature. But this simply misses the
possibility that we can talk counterfactually about pure nature (and that there might be a
use in so doing).
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former our talk and thought about that reality. Now, even if we cannot point to
some aspects of our lives or polities and assign them to the box ‘nature’, whilst
putting others into a tub marked ‘grace’,26 it may still be – indeed it obviously
is the case – that I can talk truthfully about human societies in purely rational
terms, without appeal to the contents of revelation. It is just true that racism is
wrong or that the dollar/ stirling exchange rate is presently unfavourable. The
fact that I don’t need to have read the Bible to say or do these things is neither
here nor there. And that is enough of a basis for me to have conversations, and
make common cause, with people outside the Church, just as McCabe suggests.
5 Dwelling with the struggle
It is a commonplace observation that politics in Western capitalist societies are
polarising. Movements of the far-right are on the rise in much of Europe. Ex-
treme nationalists have access to governmental power in Poland and Hungary,
for example; meanwhile Donald Trump won the US presidency on a right-wing
programme described by many as populist.27 On the left, figures such as Corbyn
and Sanders, and movements such as Podemos and Syriza, have put forward
programmes well to the left of traditional social democracy, whereas parties
pursuing more centrist programmes have suffered at the polls. Within Britain,
beyond the left-right split, division on the basis of how people voted in the EU
referendum continues to define positions and dominate debate.
In circumstances such as these it is unsurprising that there have been calls
for Christians to act as a unifying force, bringing people together and damp-
ening down tensions. It can almost go unquestioned that this is the proper
Christian response to times like the present. The enduring value of McCabe’s
writing on classs struggle is precisely to question this. It is not obvious that
Christians ought to attempt to pacify social struggle, both because in so doing
they risk abandoning legitimate movements for justice, but also because conflict
might be intrinsic to a particular social order, so that attempts to quieten it
function to shore up the position of dominant groups. In such situations the
role of the Christian, committed to human flourishing and the ending of re-
lationships of domination, is to take sides, joining with the dominated group
in the hope of ending the struggle through winning it. Whilst doing this, of
course, the Christian must also hold view her fight as relative, to be seen in the
context of God’s coming Kingdom. In the end, human salvation comes as a gift,
secured through the death and resurrection of Christ. Far from depriving the
urge for social change of motivation, however, this promised gift assures us that
God has declared himself for humanity and gives us every reason to fight for its
flourishing.
McCabe’s insight that joining this fight will very often involve taking sides in
human conflicts is an essential one at a time like the present. Of course - to an-
26Which we assuredly cannot because, as McCabe tirelessly insisted, God is not an agent
within the world such that we could neatly delineate his gracious action.
27In actual fact, I think the label ‘populist’ is at best unhelpful and at worst dangerous,
but that is how Trump (and, for that matter, Sanders) are often described.
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ticipate a criticism at this point – it can sometimes be difficult to identify which
side is the correct one to side with. It is perhaps rather less difficult, however,
than some people suggest (and remember that McCabe, following Marx, didn’t
throw in his lot with the working class because he thought they were better
people, more deserving, or otherwise morally noteworthy, but rather because he
believed that their victory uniquely would end the class struggle). But at the
end of the day, such is political life: one has to reflect, throw oneself into the
struggle, reflect some more, and so on: ‘beautiful souls’ exempt themselves from
this process at the cost of serving the status quo.
Yet it is not the details of McCabe’s social analysis and prescription that
are most valuable to us, profoundly sympathetic to them though I am. Instead
the aspect of his legacy which we most urgently need to receive consists in un-
dermining a certain picture of Christian political engagement, one which has
become increasingly commonplace in churches in recent years. McCabe talks
us out of supposing that the role of Christians in politics must always be to
work for immediate cohesion, calling on people to give up their disputes and
come together. He reminds us that peace is an eschatological gift; he invites us
to look carefully at our society and see that conflict is intrinsic to it. In other
words he urges us to see the truth about the Kingdom and the truth about the
world. Other voices might sound more comforting, but if they are not truthful
that comfort is hollow.
The theme of false prophets crying peace where there is no peace recurs in
the Old Testament, not only in Jeremiah but also in Ezekiel. McCabe’s view
is much like Ezekiel’s; those proclaiming an easy peace are not to be trusted.
Indeed their counsel will lead to ruin:
They have misled my people, saying, “Peace,” when there is no
peace; and because, when the people build a wall, these prophets
smear whitewash on it. Say to those who smear whitewash on it
that it shall fall.28
*
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